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Abstract. Increased interconnectivity, interoperability and complexity of com-
munication in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (further only SCADA) 
systems, resulted in increasing efficiency of industrial processes. However, the 
recently isolated SCADA systems are considered as the targets of considerable 
number of cyber-attacks. Because of this, the SCADA cyber-security is under 
constant pressure. In this article we examine suitability of current state signa-
ture based Intrusion Detection System (further only IDS) in SCADA systems. 
Therefore, we deeply evaluate the Snort and the Quickdraw rules based on sig-
natures in order to specify their relations to SCADA cyber security. We report 
the results of the study comprising more than two hundred rules. 
Keywords: Cyber Security, Intrusion Detection System, Industrial Control Sys-
tem, Signature. 
1 Introduction 
An increasing number of the cyber-attacks relating to the Supervisory Control and 
Data Acquisition (further only SCADA) systems have the eminent influence on the 
SCADA cybersecurity. Accordingly, there is necessity to implement an Intrusion 
Detection System (further only IDS) in the SCADA systems. Horkan (2015) conclud-
ed that the IDS will become an essential part of the SCADA system. Moreover, Pollet 
(2013) predicted increasing dependency of the SCADA systems on IT; therefore, the 
percentage of industrial companies utilizing the IDS will rapidly grow. The imple-
mentation of the IDS in the SCADA systems has been widely investigated (Cheung et 
al., 2006; Verba and Milvich, 2008; Valli, 2009; Fovino et al., 2010; Zhu and Sastry, 
2013; Yang et al., 2013; Maglaras and Jiang, 2014). Furthermore, Verba and Milvich 
(2008) suggest that the current state of signature or anomaly based IDS are not suited 
to be widely deployed in the SCADA systems; accordingly, future research is needed. 
Moreover, there is a little research dealing with the current state of IDS rules related 
to the SCADA. The previous research has not fully addressed the type, priorities and 
number of SCADA rules. This study was designed to investigate the IDS SCADA 
rules. In this paper, we present the comparison and evaluation between two groups of 
SCADA-based rules (the Snort and the Quickdraw rules).  
2 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
The SCADA systems are developed for monitoring, management and control of in-
dustrial systems. Moreover, the SCADA is an internal part of the Critical Information 
Infrastructure (further only CII). Nowadays, the CII is an essential part almost every 
sector of the critical infrastructure (transportation systems, power plants, dams, water 
treatment, oil production, chemicals, gas distribution, etc.). Therefore, every cyber-
attack on the CII systems can be considered as a lethal attack. It can result in fatal 
damage to the environment, population or a country.  
The SCADA have a positive influence on contemporary society; nevertheless, 
these systems are under increasing pressure to improve efficiency and interoperabil-
ity. Thus, the recently isolated systems are becoming more dependent on interconnec-
tion with external technologies.[1]  This trend resulted in the emergence of new vul-
nerabilities and, accordingly, the protected system becomes more vulnerable to new 
cyber-attacks. 
3 Evaluation of ICT and SCADA Cyber Security 
The Evaluation of the main differences between ICT and SCADA cyber security is 
crucial for this research and especially for the IDS. Accordingly, we used three securi-
ty criteria (availability, confidentiality and integrity) to describe differences between 
ICT and SCADA cyber security. Their relationship can be seen in Fig. 1. As a result, 
confidentiality is the most important security element for ICT. On the other hand, 
availability is the most important for the SCADA. That is why every threat to the 
continuity of the SCADA processes is considered as critical.   
 
Fig. 1. The comparison of ICT and SCADA cyber security. [2] 
4 Intrusion Detection System 
An Intrusion Detection System is characterized as a system for detection of an intrud-
er. It is a reactive tool used for monitoring, detecting and recording dangerous behav-
ior in a computer network or a computer system. The IDS inspecting each packet 
within protected computer network and looking for malicious content.[3] Thus, there 
are two main detect methodologies (signature and anomaly based). However, we deal 
only with signature based methodology. Every registered intrusion is reported to the 
operator who will make appropriate decision to eliminate this threat.  
4.1 IDS Architecture 
The IDS architecture is composed of four main parts. All parts are interconnected and 
disruption of one of them has serious consequences to the whole system. The results, 
given in Fig. 2, show entire common IDS. 
 
Fig. 2. Common architecture of the IDS.[4] 
There is a specification of each IDS component: 
 The first and essential element in Fig. 2 is a sensor, which is also known as a 
agent. It is used for monitoring, recording and evaluating network traffic. 
The sensor is being used in conjunction with the network intrusion detection 
system (further only the NIDS) while the agent is used in conjunction with 
the host intrusion detection system (further only the HIDS).[4] 
 The management server is a centralized device that accepts information from 
the agents or the sensors. These data can be further processed to a qualita-
tively higher level. The management server can correlate inputs from multi-
ple sensors or agents in order to increase detection capabilities. However, the 
outputs from the management server can be used in the control and manage-
ment improvement of particular sensors or agents. 
 The database server is designed to store data communication from the sen-
sors or the agents. It can also store knowledge database based on signatures 
and other detection methodologies for detecting an intrusion.  
 The Console is a software interface between the user and the IDS. The con-
sole is commonly used for administration or configuration of the sensors or 
the agents.[4] 
4.2 Snort IDS Components 
Snort is an open source IDS. This system is divided into five main components which 
are hierarchically organized. The whole components are shown in Fig. 3. 
   
 
Fig. 3. Snort IDS components.[5] 
The diagram in Fig. 3 determines the basic architecture of famous Snort IDS. The first 
fundamental operation of every IDS is to capture particular packets of network traffic. 
The captured data are modified for the preprocessor. The preprocessor is a component 
of IDS which is responsible for modifying packets into a standardized form for the 
detection engine. The detection engine is the most important part of the IDS. Its main 
purpose is to detect suspicious activity in network traffic. Snort can use more than one 
detection methodologies. However, if the evaluated packet is harmless, then it is dis-
carded. On the other hand, if the packet is detected as an intrusion attempt, then the 
record and warning are generated. Output modules finally generate a final message to 
the user.[5] 
5 Signature-Based IDS Detection 
The signature-based detection is one of the most basic methods for malware detection. 
This methodology is based on the comparison. Therefore, the IDS generally use rules 
to compare real traffic patterns with cyber security signatures. They matches to par-
ticular cyber-attacks, moreover each of them is stored in the signature database. This 
methodology is very effective against known cyber threats and has a low rate of false 
positive detection. On the other hand, it is often ineffective against unknown threats 
like zero-day attacks or the modifications of already known cyber-attacks. Further-
more, due to the comparison of every packet in network traffic with all signatures; 
there is a momentous time-consuming process, which is responsible for slowing down 
the system operation. This is the serious problem for the SCADA systems. 
5.1 Definition of IDS rule based on signature 
Each rule-based signature starts with a header. Moreover, within the header are par-
ticular criteria, which allow the comparison between the rule and the network traffic. 
The header also specifies an action for a case when a match is found. The architecture 
of a Snort header shows Fig. 4. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Components of the Snort header.[6] 
Each segment in Fig. 4 is subsequently discussed: 
 Action - this is an action that will take place when the rule exactly matches 
the packet. This segment is determined by actions such as alerting, logging, 
ignoring, blocking packet and many others. 
 Protocol – this segment determines a communication protocol for which the 
rule is proposed. 
 Address - the IP address used as source or destination depending on the di-
rectional operator.  
 Port - it can be described as a source or a destination port used in a network 
communication. 
 Directional operator – determines, if the address and the port are consid-
ered as the source or the destination port. 
The remaining part of the rule contains additional criteria for detection of cyber-
attacks and the background information. An example of the whole rule can be seen in 
Fig. 5.  
 
Fig. 5. Architecture of the Snort rule.[7] 
Fig. 5 shows the rule for the DNP3 SCADA communication protocol. The IDS is 
designed to generate the alert message when a rule matches with the data. Moreover, 
the rule is dedicated for TCP protocol. “$EXTERNAL_NET” and “20000” were set 
as source IP address and source port. On the contrary, destination IP address and des-
tination port were set as “$HOME_NET” and “any”.  
The remaining part of the rule is known as a rule options is responsible for provid-
ing additional information. The content of this segment is not static, furthermore, it 
may change. However, the Fig. 5 shows common rule composition: 
 msg – it is used for quotations of the rule. In this case, the msg describes 
communication protocol and background information. 
 flow – the flow is used for TCP sessions. Moreover, it describes packet di-
rection for which the rule is made. Fig. 5 shows the rule that is applicable on-
ly on TCP session.  
 dnp3_ind – the dnp3_ind is a particular rule option for the DNP3 protocol. It 
is used to match against flag bits in a DNP3 packet header.  
 reference – this segment is responsible for accompanying information about 
the rule. It is not necessary for detection; therefore, it can be ignored. 
 classtype – the classtype provides a classification of the alert and its priority 
for the rule. The sample of the classtype is shown in Fig. 5. However, there 
is a classification of alert without the priority; accordingly, the priority is set 
on default value in the classification.config file. Furthermore, low priority 
value represents a high threat.  
 sid – the sid can be described as a rule ID. Moreover, the sid number up to 
one million is reserved for Snort rules. The sid number over one million is 
dedicated for local rules.  
 rev – the rev determines how many times the rule was modified. It can be al-
so determined as a version of the rule. 
6 Methods 
The Snort and the Quickdraw SCADA rules were collected due to the evaluation of 
possibilities of deployment the IDS in the SCADA system. The Snort and the Quick-
draw provide databases of SCADA rules used by a considerable number of organiza-
tions. This article is dealing with the comparison between the Snort and the Quick-
draw SCADA rules. The research is examined according to the following criteria: the 
number of SCADA rules, the type of cyber-attack alerts and priority of the rule. Thus, 
the rules were collected from the Snort and the Quickdraw databases. The collected 
rules are usually used for the Modbus and the DNP3 communication protocols. The 
Modbus and the DNP3 rules were selected based on their ports; whereas, the Modbus 
communication protocol uses port 502 and the DNP3 communication protocol uses 
port 20000. The total sample consist more than 100 rules. In the follow-up phase of 
the study, we evaluated collected data in order to obtain crucial information for the 
purpose of the article. In the interest of determining the relationship between rules, a 
quantitative data analysis was used. Each rule was evaluated and classified.  
7 Results 
The aim of the article is the evaluation of the cyber threats in relation to the SCADA 
systems. In order to evaluate the SCADA rules, we determined three objectives. The 
first objective of the research is to evaluate the data in term of number. The compari-
son of the SCADA rules is shown in Fig. 6. 
 Fig. 6. The comparison of IDS SCADA rules. 
Fig. 6 shows the distribution of rules per SCADA communication protocols and pro-
vides comparison between the Snort and the Quickdraw rules.  As can be seen, Snort 
provides the highest amount of Modbus rules (58 rules), compared to Quickdraw with 
14 rules. On the other hand, Quickdraw has the highest amount of the DNP3 rules (14 
rules), compared to Snort with 10 rules. 
 The second objective of the research is to evaluate cyber-attack alerts. The Fig. 7 
shows a representation of the alerts generated by the Snort and the Quickdraw rules in 
relation with Modbus protocol. Each alert is represented by the percentage of cases. 
There is an eminent difference between Snort and Quickdraw. The distribution of the 
rule is divergent. Almost 92% of all Snort rules are focused on protection against 
Generic Protocol Command Decode. On the other hand, the Quickdraw rules are 
mainly focused on the defense against Attempted Information Leak with 28% and the 
Detection of Non-Standard Protocol or Event. 
 
Fig. 7. The comparison of the cyber-attack alerts in relation with Modbus. 
In order to meet the second objective, we need to determine the Snort and the Quick-
draw cyber-attack alerts in relation with the DNP3 communication protocol. As can 
be seen in Fig. 8, there is only one alert type of the Snort DNP3 rule. All rules are 
focused on the cyber-attack based on Generic Protocol Command Decode (100%); 
whereas, the Quickdraw rules are much more diverse than Snort rules. The Figure 
shows the distribution of all Quickdraw rules. The rules are mostly responsible for the 




Fig. 8. The comparison of the cyber-attack alerts in relation with DNP3. 
The third objective is focused on the specification of the Snort and the Quickdraw 
rules priorities in relation with the Modbus and the DNP3 communication protocols. 
The rule with priority 1 is the most crucial for the SCADA system while the rule with 
priority 3 is the least important for the SCADA system.  As can be seen in Fig. 9, the 
most of the Snort Modbus rules are classified by priority 3 (91%). Moreover, the 
Quickdraw Modbus rules can be mostly characterized by priority 2 (43%) and priority 
1 (36%). 
 
Fig. 9. The distribution of the Modbus priorities. 
The second part of the third objective is dealing with the specification of the Snort 
and the Quickdraw rules priority in relation with the DNP3 communication protocol. 
The Fig. 10 shows that 100% of the Snort rules are determined by priority 3. In the 
case of Quickdraw, there is a large group of rules with priority 2 with 73%. 
 
Fig. 10. The distribution of the DNP3 priorities. 
8 Discussions 
The objective of the article was to evaluate the SCADA cyber security. Therefore, this 
case study was based on Snort and Quickdraw IDS rules in relation to the SCADA.  
The results are consistent with earlier studies conducted with IDS rules (Shah and 
Singh, 2012; Ulltveit-Moe and Oleshchuk, 2010; Khamphakdee et al., 2014). 
The assessment of the IDS rules is performed according to different perspectives. 
In general, the Snort rules are mostly focused on Modbus communication protocol 
compared to Quickdraw. Moreover, the overall results indicate the dominance of 
Snort rules in terms of number. However, the diversity of the Snort rules is low; fur-
thermore, the Snort rules are mainly focused on Generic Protocol Command Decode 
alert. This type of alert has a low priority; accordingly, the Snort rules are not essen-
tial for the SCADA cyber security. On the other hand, the Quickdraw rules provide 
the appropriate diversity. Furthermore, they are mainly aimed at dangerous cyber-
attacks. An interesting fact is that Quickdraw rules protecting the SCADA systems 
against Denial of Service attack. This type of attack represents an eminent danger to 
the availability of the system; therefore, it is the most critical threat for the SCADA. 
The overall results indicate that the difference between Snort and Quickdraw rules is 
noticeable. Every SCADA system relying only on IDS with SNORT rules is vulnera-
ble by a considerable number of cyber-attacks. Nonetheless, it is notable that the 
Snort provides another layer of cyber security, even though it is not an effective solu-
tion. 
It should be noted that this study has been primarily concerned with the SCADA-
particular rules. However, the considerable number of cyber-attacks is focused on the 
IT systems interconnected with the SCADA. Marginalization of the IT cyber security 
can be critical for SCADA. Nonetheless, more research is required in this area in 
order to determine the reliable cyber defense of the critical information infrastructure. 
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